Every roadmap for post-quantum cryptography starts in the same place: find out where your encryption is. Two respondents explain how to build that inventory, and why data that must stay secret longest comes first.
Post-quantum cryptography has moved from research labs to bank risk registers. A large enough quantum computer could break the RSA and elliptic curve encryption that protects payments, logins and customer records. No such machine exists yet. Still, attackers can copy encrypted data today and wait. As a result, regulators now expect banks and fintechs to plan their move to post-quantum cryptography well before the threat is real. Every open banking API call, for example, relies on encryption that post-quantum cryptography will replace.
We asked one question: is your financial institution already preparing for quantum computing threats to encryption, and what is the first practical step you took? The brief sought CISOs, security architects and CTOs at banks, payment networks and fintechs, with first-hand planning experience over commentary. Three people answered in this round, and we used two, since the third did not mention quantum computing or encryption. Neither respondent we used leads security at a financial institution, so we’ve set their advice against the official roadmaps.
Fintechbits analysis
Why post-quantum cryptography is now on the agenda
The standards are now in place. NIST approved its first three post-quantum cryptography standards, FIPS 203, 204 and 205, on 13 August 2024, it announced. They cover key exchange and digital signatures, the two jobs RSA and elliptic curve methods do today.
The deadlines followed on 27 October 2026, when NIST finalised its transition report, NIST IR 8547. RSA, ECDSA and Diffie-Hellman will be deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, whatever the key size, the Cloud Security Alliance explains. Deprecated does not mean banned. However, firms still using those algorithms after 2030 must accept and record the risk.
The timelines regulators have set
The UK set its own milestones for post-quantum cryptography in March 2025. The NCSC wants discovery and an initial plan by 2028, priority systems moved by 2031 and full migration by 2035, according to its guidance. It also expects banks to move earlier, in step with global partners.
The G7 Cyber Expert Group went further for finance in January 2026. Its roadmap suggests moving the most critical systems in 2030 to 2032, with 2035 as the overall target. It is not binding. Its six phases put discovery and inventory second, after awareness and preparation. Meanwhile, the EU wants member states to start by the end of 2026 and move critical infrastructure by the end of 2030, the European Commission says.
Start with a full inventory
Abhishek Pareek is founder and director of Coders.dev, a marketplace for outsourced software developers.
“Preparing for post-quantum security isn’t about an immediate hardware upgrade. It’s about making the financial system adaptable in how it encrypts data. From my work combining financial regulatory compliance and technology operations, I’ve learned that the first step isn’t the upgrade. It’s a full cryptographic inventory. You can’t protect what you don’t know about, and most financial institutions don’t know exactly where their old encryption methods sit across their systems.
So we start with an audit of the entire tech stack. We need to find out where sensitive data is encrypted, which algorithms are used, where keys are managed, and whether they rely on older algorithms like RSA or ECC, which a large enough quantum computer could break using Shor’s algorithm. This matters most for data with a long retention period, such as mortgage documents, long-term insurance policies and historical banking records, because that’s the data most likely to be gathered today and decrypted later.
Once the inventory is done, the next step is a crypto-agile security architecture. The goal is to separate encryption from other core business functions and processes, so that switching to NIST-compliant post-quantum encryption becomes a software upgrade rather than a major project.”
Abhishek Pareek, Founder and Director, Coders.dev
His first step matches the official guidance on post-quantum cryptography. The NCSC says any migration must start with a clear picture of the current estate. The G7 roadmap also calls for a full inventory of cryptographic assets and third-party dependencies. His focus on mortgage records is sound too, since data that must stay secret for decades is most exposed.
His point on separating encryption from business logic is often called crypto-agility. It lets a firm swap algorithms without rebuilding the systems around them, so each later change to post-quantum cryptography costs far less. However, part of his original answer was missing from the text we received, so we’ve described this step in general terms. We also added that only a large enough quantum computer could break RSA or ECC. He names no client, and Coders.dev supplies developers, so this is advice from the supplier side.
Rank data by how long it must stay secret
Ankit Sarawagi curates CFO Matrix, a finance resource, and focused on how to set priorities.
“Know where your encryption is, who it comes from and what it protects. One person should own this list.
Prioritise based on how long you need to keep the data confidential. Even if no one has a powerful enough quantum computer today, attackers can store encrypted data now and decrypt it later. Bring anything you need to keep confidential for many years to the top of your list.
With NIST having released its first post-quantum standards in 2024, you now have some real guidance. Ask everyone what their strategy is. Most institutions will rely heavily on their suppliers for encryption. In short, you won’t be able to plan your migration without knowing where your encryption is.”
Ankit Sarawagi, Curator, CFO Matrix
His priority rule is the most practical idea here. Ranking systems by how long their data must stay secret tells a bank where post-quantum cryptography matters first. A payment message that is worthless in a week can wait, while a 25-year mortgage record cannot. His original answer implied the bank itself could store data and view it later, so we’ve clarified that attackers pose that risk.
Also, his point about suppliers fits the G7 roadmap, which warns that vendor plans for post-quantum cryptography are often unclear. Fintechs built on partner banks depend even more on other firms’ systems, as our explainer on banking-as-a-service describes. Still, he has not run a migration himself, so this is general guidance rather than first-hand experience.
What works for post-quantum cryptography in banks
The two answers and the official roadmaps point to a clear order of work. First, name one owner and list where encryption is used, what it protects and who supplies it. Next, rank systems by how long their data must stay confidential, so long-lived records move to post-quantum cryptography first. Then ask every supplier for a written migration plan with dates, and build those answers into contracts. Finally, separate encryption from business logic whenever systems are rebuilt, so later changes become routine. Test post-quantum cryptography early too, because its larger keys can strain older systems.
What to watch next
The next test for post-quantum cryptography is how regulators turn guidance into supervision. Watch whether the FCA, PRA or US banking agencies ask firms to show their inventories. Also watch whether the EU’s end-2026 start date brings new rules for banks. In addition, card networks may set their own dates, since a bank cannot migrate a payment rail alone.
Above all, post-quantum cryptography starts with knowing where your encryption is. Firms that map their systems and suppliers now can migrate in order, while those that wait could reach 2030 with no plan.
FintechBits covers payments, banking and fintech developments for readers in the US and UK. This article is for information only and is not financial advice. Views expressed are those of the FintechBits editorial team.



